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The Military-Environmental Complex
Summary
Although the military’s operations are largely exempt from environmental laws and regulations when those
laws conflict with its national security mission, the military has important incentives to reduce its reliance on
fossil fuels and combat climate change. If nurtured properly, the military’s extensive undertaking to improve
its sustainable energy use and reduce demand for fossil-fuel-derived energy has the potential to become one
important tool in the environmental regulatory toolkit.
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Indeed, when it comes to energy use, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) is the single 
largest consumer of energy in the nation, as 
well as the single largest emitter of green-
house gases. The military’s total energy costs 
in fiscal year 2011 were $19.3 billion: $4.1 
billion to power its facilities, and $15.2 bil-
lion for operational energy expenses related 
to military combat operations. The DoD 
is the nation’s largest landlord; it manages 
more than 500 installations in the United 
States and overseas, covering approximately 
2.3 billion square feet of building space. The 
DoD also manages approximately 28 mil-
lion acres of land in the United States. This 
physical footprint translates into an enor-
mous carbon footprint. Spanning its vast 
and varied facilities and global operations 
on land, air, and sea, the military’s energy 
needs are both deep and broad.2 Despite the 
significant impact that its energy needs have 
on the environment, the military’s opera-
tions are largely exempt from environmen-
tal laws and regulations when those laws 
conflict with the military’s national security 
mission.
Yet in reality, the military’s mission of 
ensuring national security is deeply inter-
twined with the need to reduce energy use 
and develop alternative and renewable fuel 
sources. While the military is not likely to 
become the environment’s greatest advocate 
overnight, it has important incentives to 
reduce its reliance on fossil fuels and combat 
climate change. Fuel convoys supporting 
combat missions are under constant threat. 
From 2003 to 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
more than 3,000 Army personnel and con-
tractors were wounded or killed in action as 
a result of attacks on fuel and water resupply 
convoys. Reducing the military’s reliance 
on petroleum and developing alternative 
energy sources such as solar power therefore 
could help save lives. Likewise, the mission 
The MiliTary-environMenTal 
CoMplex 1
Sarah e. lighT
The U.S. military and its mission to enhance and defend national 
security often are perceived to be at odds with environmental 
protection and sustainability. 
abouT The auThor
Sarah E. Light, JD
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and  
Business Ethics, The Wharton School
Sarah E. Light is an Assistant Professor of Legal 
Studies and Business Ethics at the Wharton School 
of the University of Pennsylvania, where she teaches 
Environmental Management, Law and Policy, as well 
as Negotiation.   
Previously, she served for ten years as an 
Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, Civil Division, and for four years 
as the Chief of the Office’s Environmental Protection 
Unit.  In that capacity, she represented federal agen-
cies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, and others in affirmative and defensive 
environmental litigation.  
Professor Light previously has taught Environ-
mental Management, Law and Policy at the Earth 
Institute at Columbia University, and served as a pro 
bono mediator in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York.  Her scholarly 
articles have appeared in the Yale Law Journal, the 
Tulane Law Review, and forthcoming works will be 
published in the U.C.L.A. Law Review and the Bos-
ton College Law Review.  Professor Light earned 
her J.D. from Yale Law School, an M. Phil in Politics 
from Oxford University where she was a Rhodes 
Scholar, and an A.B. in Social Studies magna cum 
laude from Harvard College. 
of national security drives the military to 
ensure that its installations and facilities are 
protected from disruptions to the electric 
grid—not just from possible cyber-attack, 
but from climate-change related natural 
disasters. The military also recognizes that 
climate change is likely to carry significant 
and destabilizing geopolitical impacts, 
contributing to poverty and food and water 
scarcity, and thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of armed confrontations between 
nations over access to resources. That the 
Russian Navy is now patrolling shipping 
lanes in the Arctic Ocean newly opened 
from melting ice only underscores the 
impact of climate change on potential areas 
of conflict. Consequently, while the law 
suggests that the military may disregard 
environmental laws if they conflict with 
its national security mission, the military 
has political and economic incentives that 
prompt it to do more than the law requires 
in the area of sustainable energy use.
The exceptional alignment between the 
military mission and the need to conserve 
energy, address climate change, and develop 
renewables, brings equally exceptional 
potential: for stimulating the development 
of new technologies, providing large-scale 
commercial support for existing tech-
nologies, and helping to drive behavioral 
changes on a grand scale. Policymakers need 
to think carefully about how to harness this 
alignment, and how cooperation between 
the military and the private sector can 
advance these ends. If nurtured properly, the 
military’s extensive undertaking to improve 
its sustainable energy use and reduce 
demand for fossil-fuel-derived energy both 
on the battlefield and in permanent instal-
lations, in which the military’s interests are 
intertwined with those of Congress, the 
President, and the private sector—what I 
call the Military-Environmental Complex—
has the potential to become one important 
tool in the regulatory toolkit to combat 
climate change. 
Military stimulation of technologi-
cal development during has deep roots. At 
its height during the twentieth century, 
military needs played a major role in driving 
the development of new technologies such 
as semiconductors, the global positioning 
system, the Internet, and computers that 
not only transformed war fighting, but the 
civilian realm as well. Both military-driven 
innovation (R&D) and procurement from 
the private sector drove this innovation.  As 
a first user of new environmental technolo-
gies, the military not only can help evaluate 
their effectiveness, but by its very size cre-
ates a needed market to simulate innova-
tion, as it has done in the past with aircraft, 
electronics, and the internet. The mere fact 
that a project supports military interests—
rather than general commercial interests—
may drive support among other institutional 
players who may feel more strongly con-
nected to the value of protecting national 
security than other values such as energy 
independence or environmental protection. 
Moreover, the DoD’s exceptional hierarchi-
cal nature allows its leadership to consider 
the importance of changing norms and 
behavior in ways that might be unthinkable 
in the private sector. In the long run, the 
Military-Environmental Complex and the 
relationships it both builds upon and engen-
ders between the military and the private 
sector could have important consequences 
not only for the development and com-
mercialization of clean energy technologies 
that have widespread civilian applications, 
but also for the diffusion of environmental 
practices into the broader population. 
At the same time, it is important to be 
cautious in relying upon this exceptional 
alignment between the military’s mission 
and society’s needs to develop clean energy 
technology. As historical lessons from the 
military-industrial complex demonstrate, 
there is the potential for rent-seeking behav-
ior by elected representatives, private firms 
and industry that must be addressed. 
   This brief examines the governmental 
and corporate actors—and the public-private 
partnerships between them—that propel the 
Military-Environmental Complex, pointing 
out its enormous potential benefits and well 
as the possible pitfalls, and concludes with 
recommendations for further research and 
future policymaking.
governMenT inSTiTuTionS 
Driving The MiliTary-
environMenTal CoMplex
While the potential of the Military-
Environmental Complex has yet to be fully 
tapped, Congress and the White House, as 
well as the DoD itself, already have been 
taking steps to encourage its development—
despite the exemptions that are given to the 
military under environmental and adminis-
trative law. 
In addition to Congressional mandates 
that instruct all federal agencies to promote 
energy conservation, efficiency, and renew-
able sourcing, Congress has directed the 
DoD specifically to reduce energy demand 
and develop alternative renewable energy 
sources, primarily in its facilities. For exam-
ple, Congress has required that by fiscal year 
2025, the DoD produce or procure at least 
25 percent of the energy it consumes within 
its facilities from renewable energy sources. 
Congress also has directed the DoD to con-
sider using solar or other forms of renewable 
energy for facilities construction projects 
(including housing), to use energy-efficient 
(Energy Star/FEMP) products in such hous-
ing, and to prefer energy-efficient equip-
ment generally. Congress has mandated 
too that the DoD prefer hybrid, electric or 
plug-in vehicles that are of reasonable cost 
and meet Departmental needs.3 
Congress has provided additional finan-
cial incentives for the DoD to meet these 
goals. The DoD is authorized to reinvest 
half of its energy cost savings into addi-
tional conservation measures, and half into 
location-specific improvements for service 
members. Congress also permits the DoD 
to sell to a utility company the electricity it 
 1 This brief is excerpted from a larger article that will appear 
in the May 2014 issue of the Boston College Law Review. 
The Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative is grateful to the 
editors of the Boston College Law Review for permission 
to use this material.  A working version of the article 
also is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2332195. For fuller citations, please 
refer to the working paper or the article.
 2 Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Fact Sheet: 
DoD’s Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Initia-
tives (July 2011); Department of Defense Annual Energy 
Management Report for Fiscal Year 2011, 1 & n.2, 14 
(Sept. 2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/energy/library/
FY.2011.AEMR.PDF; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Interior, Interior and Defense Departments Join Forces 
to Promote Renewable Energy on Federal Lands (Aug. 
6, 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid=15498.
 3  10 U.S.C. § 2911(e); 10 U.S.C. § 2915; 10 U.S.C. § 
2922b; 10 U.S.C. § 2922f; 10 U.S.C. § 2922g (the 
preference for hybrid, electric or plug-in vehicles does not 
apply to “tactical vehicles designed for use in combat.”).
 4 10 U.S.C. §§ 2911, 2912, 2916, 2922a.
 5 Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Eco-
nomic Performance, Exec. Order 13514, Section 1, 74 
Fed. Reg. 52117, 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
 6 Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Trans-
portation Management, Exec. Order 13423, 72 Fed. Reg. 
produces from alternative or cogeneration 
facilities under the DoD’s jurisdiction, and 
to credit any proceeds to the appropriation 
account for the supply of electricity. Perhaps 
most importantly, the DoD can enter into 
30-year Power Purchase Agreements with 
private developers to promote the develop-
ment of alternative energy generation on 
military lands. These contracts stimulate 
the generation of alternative and renew-
able energy sources with significant private 
investment. Private developers build and 
own the generation equipment, while the 
military enters into long-term contracts to 
purchase the electricity produced, thus guar-
anteeing stable demand for a sufficient time 
period for the private financiers to recoup 
their investment. The DoD is unique among 
federal agencies in this ability to enter into 
such long-term agreements.4
The White House likewise has directed 
all federal agencies, including the DoD, to 
improve their energy profile so as to lead 
the nation by example. Executive orders 
issued by President George W. Bush and 
President Barak Obama have set goals for 
the use of renewable energy and directed 
agencies to establish targets for reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions and 
water consumption. For example, in 2009, 
President Obama signed Executive Order 
13,514, which requires all Federal govern-
ment agencies to disclose greenhouse gas 
emissions information annually from their 
direct and indirect activities.  The Order also 
directs each agency to propose to the White 
House agency-wide greenhouse gas reduc-
tion targets to reach by 2020 as compared to 
a 2008 baseline.5  Executive Order 13,423, 
signed by President Bush in 2007, simi-
larly directed Federal agencies to improve 
energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and water consumption, to 
require acquisition of sustainable goods, 
and mandates sustainable federal vehicle 
fleets.6  That Executive Order also built on 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s require-
ment that federal agencies consume certain 
set percentages of energy from renewable 
sources by requiring that at least half of the 
renewable energy come from “new” renew-
able sources, defined as “sources of renew-
able energy placed into service after January 
1, 1999.”7
It is important to note that these Con-
gressional mandates and executive orders 
contain numerous exemptions related to 
national security and military activities, and 
thus apply only to the DoD’s use of energy 
for its facilities, not for its operations (which 
account for approximately 75 percent of the 
DoD’s energy use).8 To target operations, 
Congress instead directed that the DoD 
create a new Office of Operational Energy 
Plans and Programs, headed by an Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, to focus the DoD’s 
attention on reducing operational energy 
use as well. 
Beyond any legal mandates, however, 
the DoD itself has been launching initia-
tives to reduce and become more efficient 
in its energy use, to change behavior with 
respect to energy consumption, and to 
stimulate innovation and the development 
of clean technology not only in its facili-
ties, but in its military operations as well. 
This internal motivation has largely come 
from field commanders who have asked 
the DoD to “unleash us from the tether of 
fuel” to improve operational capacity and 
reduce combat deaths.9 Again, this speaks 
to the military’s internal incentives to 
reduce energy demand, increase efficiency 
and explore alternative sources of fuel—in 
particular, so that fewer lives will be lost 
guarding extensive, petroleum-intensive fuel 
convoys on the ground, and to increase the 
military’s capabilities.
The DoD’s actions not only acknowl-
edge the validity of climate change; they 
recognize it, along with fossil fuel use, as a 
threat to the military’s core mission and a 
drain on its operations. The solution, from 
the DoD’s perspective, is to reduce demand 
for energy, to increase energy efficiency, and 
to use renewable fuels that do not require 
the same long “tail” to bring to the theater 
of war. Energy efficiency and reduced use in 
this way can enhance the functioning and 
force of the military. Missions can go father 
without refueling, running generators, or 
bringing fuel convoys to the battlefield. 
A focus on governmental institutional 
drivers should not obscure the significant 
role that the private sector plays in driving 
the Military-Environmental Complex, both 
as a source of technological innovation and a 
source of funding.    
CollaboraTion WiTh The  
privaTe SeCTor
The Military-Environmental Complex is 
characterized by a deep level of intercon-
nectedness between the military and the 
private sector.
First, the DoD, at times in cooperation 
with other agencies, is providing funding to 
private sector firms to finance the develop-
ment of new renewable energy technologies 
that ultimately may have civilian spinoff 
potential in the energy sector. Government 
funding is virtually essential for developing 
and commercializing these new technolo-
gies, which currently are more expensive per 
kilowatt/hour than conventional petroleum 
and fossil-fuel based energy, in the absence 
of a carbon tax on externalities or other 
equivalent regulation. For example, under the 
auspices of programs authorized by Congress 
3913 (Jan. 26, 2007).
 7 42 U.S.C. § 15852.
 8 DoD, Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strat-
egy (June 14, 2011), available at http://energy.defense.
gov/OES_report_to_congress.pdf, at 3.
 9 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science 
Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy: More Fight – 
Less Fuel (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.acq.osd.
mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf (quoting James Mattis, 
former Marine Corps Commanding General, 1st Marine 
Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom).  
 10 http://www.serdp.org/News-and-Events/News-An-
nouncements/Program-News/New-installation-energy-
and-water-technology-demonstrations-announced-for-
FY-2013; http://www.serdp.org/Featured-Initiatives/
Installation-Energy.
 11 http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/financing/super-
espcs_hill_afb.html; http://armyeitf.com/index.php/
component/content/article/67-news/procurement/15-
d e t r i c k - n o i ? u t m _ s o u r c e = N e w s A l e r t & u t m _
m e d i u m = e m a i l & u t m _ t e r m = D e t r i c k N O I & u t m _
content=title&utm_campaign=DetrickNOIAlert; http://
www.armyeitf.com/index.php/opportunities/procure-
mentactions; Notes of Interview with John Lushetsky, 
April 12, 2013 (notes on file with author).
 12 http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/espc_ss_
dyess.pdf; http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/
espc_ss_pendleton.pdf; http://www.amerienergygroup.
“The DoD’s actions not only 
acknowledge the validity of 
climate change; they recognize 
it, along with fossil fuel use, 
as a threat to the military’s 
core mission and a drain on its 
operations.” 
com/index.php/en/daylighting-technology; http://www1.
eere.energy.gov/femp/financing/superespcs_hill_afb.
html.
 13 See, e.g., http://urbanland.uli.org/Articles/2012/
Feb/SpivakLEED; http://www.federaltimes.com/ar-
ticle/20120107/FACILITIES02/201070302/Industry-
objects-green-gov-standards. Duncan Hunter National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, §334(a); 
10 U.S.C. § 2918; 10 U.S.C. § 2922d(a).
and the DoD in the 1990s, the DoD in 2009 
launched its Installation Energy Test Bed 
Initiative, which annually awards funding on 
a competitive basis to projects submitted by 
private firms, universities, national laborato-
ries, and other organizations, involving the 
management of installation (facility) energy. 
Recent projects funded in 2013 included: a 
battery energy storage system and microgrid 
control system, a data-center liquid-cooling 
system, high-concentration photovolta-
ics, a waste gasification system, technology 
that can reduce air-conditioner energy use 
through measuring operational energy effi-
ciency, and a roof asset management system. 
Smart microgrids, which have the ability to 
reduce cost, increase the use of renewables, 
and offer energy security, have been a par-
ticular emphasis of the Test Bed Initiative.10
DoD support for research and develop-
ment of new technologies by private firms is 
nothing new; this is a role that the military 
has played, with much success, for many 
decades already. The DoD’s resources can 
make it possible for companies to explore 
experimental and expensive alternative 
energy technologies that venture capital 
firms and banks would be reluctant or unable 
to fund. And if such new energy technologies 
and sustainable methods are a social good, 
this demand for DoD financial and demand 
support may be of great social benefit.
On the flip side of the private sector’s 
demand for government financing lies the 
DoD’s active quest for private financing as it 
seeks energy security for its facilities. Under 
its so-called “enhanced use lease” authority, 
the DoD can lease property from its portfo-
lio to private firms for large-scale renewable 
energy generation projects. As noted above, 
the DoD also has unique statutory authority 
among federal agencies to enter into Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) of up to 30 
years for the provision and operation of 
energy production facilities and the purchase 
of energy produced at these facilities. The 
DoD is taking advantage of these special 
allowances in the Army’s Energy Initiatives 
Task Force (EITF) program, created by the 
Army in 2011. In keeping with Congress’s 
mandate that the DoD produce or procure at 
least 25 percent of its energy on installations 
from renewable sources by 2025, the EITF 
is facilitating the development of privately-
financed renewable energy generation facili-
ties on Army installations, including solar, 
wind, biomass and geothermal in order to 
promote energy security.11 
The DoD also has the statutory author-
ity to enter into Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPCs). These are partnerships 
with private energy service companies, which 
take responsibility for designing, financing, 
installing, and maintaining energy saving 
equipment for a client. The private firm 
receives compensation based on the realiza-
tion of a guaranteed stream of future savings, 
and excess savings then accrue to the federal 
government. Likewise, the DoD can become 
part of Utility Energy Service Contracts 
(UESCs), by which an agency enters into 
a contract with a utility that agrees to pay 
certain capital costs upfront to implement 
selected energy conservation measures. 
 The DoD already has entered into 
several of these types of arrangements. For 
example, the Air Force entered into an 
ESPC at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, 
through which it now procures 100% of its 
energy through wind power.  At Marine 
Corps Base Camp Pendleton, using both 
ESPCs and UESCs, the Marines achieved 
a 44% reduction in energy use despite an 
increase in the footprint of its facility of two 
million square feet.  Energy retrofits included 
decommissioning a steam plant, incorporat-
ing photovoltaic arrays, changing fixtures and 
using daylighting technology.12     
poTenTial ConCernS: 
leSSonS FroM The 
MiliTary-inDuSTrial 
CoMplex
Despite the positive impact they may have 
on the environment and the climate, these 
close ties between the private sector and the 
DoD, which help drive the Military-Envi-
ronmental Complex, also can be a potential 
source of concern. Indeed, the military-
industrial complex, out of which some of 
these relationships in the clean energy arena 
have grown, has largely pejorative connota-
tions. Provisions in the annual DoD budget 
authorizations between 2008-2013 suggest 
that some members of Congress have 
inserted requirements to benefit specific 
firms, voter constituencies, and domestic 
industries. For example, there are Congres-
sional directives that encourage the DoD 
to pursue alternative energy sources derived 
specifically from coal—despite the fact 
that coal-based fuel sources are unlikely to 
avoid some of the difficulties that surround 
other fossil fuels in operations. Similarly, 
Congressional mandates, restrict the DoD’s 
ability to use appropriated funds to obtain 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED) gold or platinum certifica-
tion, apparently out of concern for the U.S. 
timber industry, which is not privileged over 
foreign sources in LEED’s scoring system. 
As these details suggest, it is possible that 
the military’s interest in sustainable energy 
could be diverted to the creation of “pork” 
projects that fail to serve the DoD’s mission 
to enhance national security and increase 
military capabilities.13
Similarly, many of the companies that 
are set to work with the DoD on alterna-
tive energy projects are the same top-100 
military contractors (determined by dollar 
value of contracts) that have for years been 
part of the so-called military-industrial 
complex. These partners include Lockheed 
Martin, the Boeing Corporation, Raytheon 
Integrated Defense Systems, United Tech-
nologies Research Center, and Honeywell 
International, Inc. So some caution may be 
warranted to ensure that such contracts are 
truly in the public interest, not merely the 
pecuniary interest of the firms. 
Finally, some historical examples from 
the military-industrial complex in the 20th 
century suggest that a “dual use” strategy – 
promoting the interests of both the military 
and society simultaneously – raise concerns 
when the military is setting technological 
specifications. It may reduce the potential for 
civilian “spillover” if technologies are built 
more closely to military specifications, rather 
than to those that would benefit society as a 
whole. It also raises the risk that the military 
will, in order to obtain a comparative advan-
tage internationally, want to hold promising 
technologies close to the vest, rather than to 
promote technology diffusion. 
On the flip side, the relationship 
between the military and the private sector 
in this regard may have positive spillover 
effects. It may be that the Military-Environ-
mental Complex has the potential to influ-
ence some of these industrial giants to turn 
more “green.” If their profit motive dovetails 
with the military’s desire to reduce energy 
consumption and promote renewables, then 
this alignment may have the potential to 
change the way large private firms and gov-
ernment contractors think and behave about 
energy use. It may compel them to recon-
sider the war motive as the sole driver of 
military contracts, and replace it (or at least 
supplement it) with a sustainability motive.    
poliCy iMpliCaTionS
The military is currently one of the most 
important domestic players in the develop-
ment and adoption of new and existing 
technologies to reduce energy use and 
promote renewables. It is crucial to get this 
story right because it allows policymak-
ers to recognize that there are potentially 
substantial benefits for the environment to 
the large-scale investments made in sustain-
able practices and technologies by the U.S. 
military.  What the Military-Environmental 
Complex demonstrates is that a combina-
tion of approaches – directive, informa-
tional, behavioral, and self-initiated – are 
likely to provide the best opportunity to 
address climate change at a global level.
The dramatic scale at which the Mili-
tary-Environmental Complex potentially can 
address environmental problems therefore 
should command greater attention from 
scholars and policymakers going forward. 
Specifically, it is important for scholars and 
policymakers to consider how to promote 
policies that unleash the positive potential of 
the Military-Environmental Complex—that 
both protect national security and the envi-
ronment—while at the same time avoiding 
the potential dangers and shortcomings, in 
particular interest-group politics and rent-
seeking by private firms.
First, the President and Congress should 
expand the financial incentives that encour-
age the military to reduce demand and invest 
in renewables, and increase or expand the 
mandatory renewable portfolio requirements 
of 25 gigawatts by 2025 well beyond 2025. 
This will ensure that all players—both within 
the DoD and the private sector—under-
stand that these investments in renewables 
are long-term investments. To the extent 
that Congress can incorporate additional 
incentives for private firms to continue to 
finance major renewables generation projects, 
whether through the tax code or other leg-
islative means, this could also save taxpayer 
dollars in the long run.
Second, Congress should extend the 
ability to use 30-year Power Purchase Agree-
ments to agencies beyond the DoD—most 
importantly, to the General Services Admin-
istration, which purchases energy on behalf 
of other agencies. The potential to harness 
private financing for large-scale renewable 
projects should not be limited to the DoD 
when other agencies own and manage land 
that can also be put to use generating renew-
able sources of energy.  
Third, successful dissemination of 
technological innovation beyond government 
agencies also requires openness, rather than 
secrecy.  Thus, to the extent that the military 
is driving innovation, policymakers should 
make sure that the policy and legal landscape 
promote diffusion regarding technolo-
gies that can reduce conventional energy 
demand and develop renewables, rather 
than holding such technology close to the 
vest in the name of national security. Given 
the military’s role as a validator of climate 
science, and its recognition that climate 
change has the potential to increase violent 
conflict in the world, diffusion is likely to 
be in the military’s interests in this context. 
In this vein, the DoD and the private sector 
should create more platforms for sharing 
best practices, experience with new technol-
ogy, and information regarding potential 
opportunities for private firms to invest in 
innovation. As centers of innovation both in 
technology and ideas, universities are ideally 
situated to serve as mediators in this impor-
tant dialogue. 
Fourth, it is important to guard against 
“pork projects” and improper manipulation 
of the military’s interest in energy conserva-
tion and sustainability for private gain. More 
empirical research is warranted as to whether 
and in what circumstances there may be 
“undue influence” as opposed to normal 
political lobbying activity, and whether any 
more must be done than the protections 
already afforded by such laws as the Lob-
bying Disclosure Act of 1995, the Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act of 
2007, and the False Claims Act to prevent 
rent-seeking and fraud. Such research might 
include, for example, determining which 
interest groups are contacting members of 
Congress and the military to seek sup-
port for particular projects, whether firms 
receiving funds or contracts are established 
military contractors or new entrants to 
the market, which geographic areas of the 
country stand to benefit from these clean 
energy projects, whether those projects are in 
the interest of national security and reducing 
climate change-related risks or are trying to 
promote values other than the DoD’s core 
mission, and what impact such contacts have 
as to whether particular projects are funded. 
Despite the need for further research 
and continued caution, the Military-
Environmental Complex has already gone a 
long way to encouraging a crucial dialogue 
between government and the private sector, 
and among government institutions, about 
the goals of sustainability. With proper 
oversight and encouragement, the Military-
Environmental Complex may secure its place 
within the regulatory toolkit as a way to 
foster energy sustainability in the long term.
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brief in brief
•	 Although	the	military’s	operations	are	largely	
exempt from environmental laws and 
regulations when those laws conflict with 
its national security mission, the military has 
important incentives to reduce its reliance on 
fossil fuels and combat climate change.
•	 If	nurtured	properly,	the	military’s	extensive	
undertaking to improve its sustainable energy 
use and reduce demand for fossil-fuel-
derived energy has the potential to become 
one important tool in the environmental 
regulatory toolkit.
•	 To	help	this	tool	reach	its	potential,	policy	
changes are warranted to expand financial 
incentives, extend the benefits of special 
private financing arrangements, promote the 
open dissemination of technological innova-
tions, and guard against “pork projects” in 
the energy sphere. 
